struction bonds by the electorate, 10 and the rising costs of confinement in general, 1 state officials 12 have grown sympathetic to the argument that private enterprise can operate correctional institutions better and more cheaply than can government." Private for-profit firms now operate approximately two dozen major facilities, 1 ' including at least three medium or maximum security adult correctional institutions. 5 Appeals for private sector involvement in functions traditionally considered "public" in nature have increased in frequency and intensity, with advocates of privatization expressing confidence that the pursuit of private gain and the rolling back of state activities further the interests of the larger social order. The Reagan Administration, for example, has identified 11,000 government activities to be performed by independent contractors when economically feasible. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986, at 54, col. 1. Recently, with official sanction, a number of private firms have assumed prosecutorial and adjudicative roles previously reserved to the government. See Thompson, Who's Minding the Store?, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1986, at 24 (surveying use of private investigatory firms and private attorneys as de facto law enforcers for copyright infringement and other crimes); N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at 64 (describing private judicial system in California); Public Service, Private Profits, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 64 (discussing "Judicate," private dispute settlement firm); N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1985, at 59, col. I (describing use of lawyers as part-time magistrates).
14. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at A15, col. 1. Nashville-based Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest of the prison privatization firms, claims that it now owns or leases nine facilities containing a total of 1646 beds. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AM., PROSPECTUS 1, 4 (Sept. 1986) [ hereinafter PROSPECTUS].
criticism from some lawmakers, 16 several states hope to contract with private firms for prison operations and have enacted, or are considering, legislation authorizing privatization. In light of these developments, the courts will now have to decide cases arising in correctional facilities in which not only the cafeterias and classrooms, but the hearing rooms and cellblocks themselves, are staffed by corporate personnel. The current judicial approach, reluctance to rigorously scrutinize internal prison procedures, is, however, unequal to this task.
II. DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC PRISON

PROCEDURES AND THE WIDE DISCRETION OF PRISON PERSONNEL
A. Deference
In reviewing complaints of unconstitutional prison practices, the courts long adhered to a "hands-off" approach, refusing altogether to examine alleged violations on the premise that prisoner rights were nonexistent. 1 8 In the areas of inhumane conditions or treatment (which fall under the Eighth Amendment) 9 and practices that are facially discriminatory or vi-
16.
Telephone interview with Representative David Wright, Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Dec. 17, 1985) (legislator in whose district privately operated minimum security facility is located expresses reservations about privatization).
17. Texas, which does not yet have a privatized correctional facility, has a brief enabling statute that authorizes counties to contract for the incarceration of low-risk inmates in private detention facilities, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5115d(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986), and New Mexico has a statutory scheme that authorizes the Governor and the Legislature to direct the Department of Corrections to contract with private firms for the operation of any minimum security facility. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-17 (Cum. Supp. 1986). The Tennessee Legislature is now considering a bill to negotiate with private firms for the operation of a medium-security work camp. Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1986, at 38, col. 1. In December, 1985, the Tennessee Legislature passed a statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § § 3-15-101 to -108 (1985), establishing a Select Oversight Committee on Corrections, one of whose duties is to review the possibilities for " [p] rovision of services, facilities or programs by private contractors." Id.
at § 3-15-107. In March, 1985, the National Governors' Association passed a resolution declaring that states might wish to explore the possibilities of prison privatization, and several governors publicly expressed their eagerness to do so. N.Y. Times (noting irony that courts afford full due process protection when state statute or practice specially regulates procedures of prisons or other public bodies, but feel no such obligation when state affords such bodies "unfettered discretion").
25. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) ("[T]he inquiry of federal courts into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution or, in the case of a federal prison, a statute. The wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet constitutional a7A statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government."). and a belief in the utility of governmental delegation in the administrative state. 2 6 In Procunier v. Martinez, 2 7 the Supreme Court, while finding that official censorship stated a colorable First Amendment claim, nonetheless expounded a deferential approach that it has since chosen to follow in cases involving Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests and process rights:
Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the This rationale frees prison personnel to exercise virtually unfettered discretion over the day to day conditions of confinement, short of engaging in the most egregiously abusive practices. Reasoning that corrections personnel are best situated to adopt and execute policies necessary for institutional order, the Court has held that staff members may isolate inmates, 29 5 and provide few statewide regulations for institutional discipline." 6 Because of a willingness to rely on the training and expertise of correctional officers, the courts 3 7 and the state legislatures 8 leave the enforcement of these rules to the discretion of prison staff.
Prison staff also exercise substantial effective control over the duration and terms of confinement through a broad range of adjudicative functions. Line officers' recommendations influence parole examiners' assessments of the likelihood that an inmate will violate parole conditions or the law upon release. 8 At disciplinary hearings, prison personnel assess behavior, determine guilt or innocence, and impose sanctions. 40 In these hearings, as in proceedings regarding parole release, inmate transfer, administrative 34 . See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 7-9 (1961) (analyzing restrictions placed on inmates by staff in total institutions); L. ORLAND, supra note 2, at 66-69 (describing and criticizing "pervasive system of authoritarian rules, covering every aspect of institutional life"); G. SYKES segregation, and good time credits, the Supreme Court has determined that prisoners' liberty interests are diminished and that due process rights attach, for the most part, only to those entitlements specifically created by state law or practice. 4 1 Correctional personnel exercise wide discretion over inmates' liberty interests in other areas of prison life as well. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld guards' intrusions on inmates' privacy against both due process and Fourth Amendment challenges, again premising its deference on the institutional security rationale.
4 2 The Court has also held recently that, absent a showing of intent or deliberate indifference, a prison official's mere negligence or lack of due care that results in injury to an inmate does not constitute a due process deprivation. 43
III. JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO PRIVATE, FOR-PROFIT DELEGATIONS
In a private prison, these adjudicative and rulemaking functions that courts have traditionally left to the broad discretion of prison officers-implicating core liberty interests-will now be exercised by private employees. One must therefore inquire whether the deference paid prison officials is compatible with the rules which courts have applied in assessing the validity of delegations to private parties with potential financial biases. 
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."" ' Strictly interpreted, this clause prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers to any other institution or party, 45 but, with the expansion of the administrative state and the concomitant need for bureaucratic discretion, the principle of per se nondelegability has been widely criticized as moribund, 4 and the courts have long ceased to employ it to invalidate delegations of rulemaking and adjudicative authority to public bodies. 47 Intermittently, Supreme Court decisions have expressed concern with the breadth of such delegation, 48 but they have generally manifested this concern by narrowly construing statutes conferring power on the Executive, rather than by mandating strict standards for their implementation. 49 In addition to its general deference to administra-44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details. 53 the Supreme Court held Congress' delegation to private groups of authority to set codes of industrial competition "utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress"" because of the danger that profit-seeking might influence the rulemaking process:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? . . .The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress. 5 "
should not be presumed to have delegated taxing authority conferred on it by Article I). Although the Schechter doctrine of invalidating delegations on vague Article I grounds without specific reference to enumerated constitutional provisions has retained vitality in a few states, 5 " most federal and state courts have relied on a due process rationale instead. 57 In particular, courts have advanced three criteria for scrutinizing the vesting of discretionary governmental powers in private, for-profit individuals or groups.
First, the Supreme Court has long evinced a hostility toward the delegation of discretionary or adjudicative powers 5 " to financially interested parties, explicitly rejecting the argument that its review should focus only on actual bias and invalidating such delegations as per se violations of due 574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973) (zoning change affecting "a specific piece of property" is "usually an exercise of judicial authority"). There is no apparent reason why, in the area of delegations to private parties, the distinction should be any more discernible. In any event, even if viable as a general proposition, the distinction is moot in the prison context, since the discretionary nature of a correctional officer's job gives it a clearly adjudicative aspect, whatever rulemaking element it possesses as well. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
process upon a finding of threatened abuse alone. 9 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,10 decided only a few months after Schechter, the Supreme Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (delegating to private producers the power to regulate work hours and wages), pointing to the same intolerable combination of unaccountability and financial selfinterest 6 " that it had disapproved in Schechter, but advancing as its rationale the fact that the Act's delegation "deprived petitioners of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 2 In Fuentes v. Shevin, 6 3 the Court held unconstitutional, on due process grounds, statutes permitting a private party summarily to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin and to compel the sheriff to seize property in execution of the writ. Again, the Court was concerned with the abdication of effective state power to profit seekers, citing a special danger when private parties seeking private gain can invoke state power. 64 In several cases, the Court has expressly distinguished between the conflicts of interest which the vesting of public authority in private, profit-seeking hands creates and the tolerable possibility that public agency administrators may have previous exposure, experience, or opinions concerning matters over 
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
61. Id. at 311 ("This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.").
Id.; see also
Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 614 (1937) (upholding Virginia statute creating state milk marketing board with authority to fix minimum rates; due process violated not by delegation to official agencies but by delegation to private entities "with arbitrary capacity to make their will prevail as law"). [I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers. When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work. Id. at 18. vate parties to enact penal laws, 9 to control a city police department, 70 to maintain and take custody of state convicts, 71 and to impair constitutional rights of expression in public areas of a company town. 72 In two frequently cited opinions involving the vesting of discretionary power in public entities, Justice Brennan has argued for a limited reinvocation of the nondelegation principle (along due process lines) where sensitive liberty interests are at stake. 73 The third criterion is the absence of standards governing private delegations. 7 ' The due process test for delegation of power is most often manifested in the requirement of sharply articulated standards guarding against abuse of discretion: a "clear statement" 7 5 by the legislature of what the delegate's authority is to be. In Todd & Co. v. SEC, 78 the Third Circuit outlined the safeguards necessary to protect a statute delegating regulatory power over a securities market to private entities against invalidation on due process grounds; the statute was upheld because it required the organizations concerned to adopt detailed rules.
407 U.S. 67 (1972
7 7 The New York Court of Appeals has twice struck down statutes vesting licensing powers over harness racing in private groups without providing standards," and the New Jersey Supreme Court has invalidated a statute delegating to a medical society, a private corporation, the power to determine who may practice medicine in the state. 
IV. APPLYING THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD IN PRIVATE PRISONS
This judicial hostility to delegations that pose a risk of abuse by forprofit entities is incompatible with the deference that courts pay to correctional officials. With the advent of private prisons,, this tension is no longer merely hypothetical. 8 0 Any privatization of disciplinary and discretionary functions in prisons will allow personnel paid and managed by private corporations to impose rules upon inmates convicted by the state. Private prisons implicate each of the three nondelegation concerns outlined above: financial bias, impingement on fundamental rights, and absence of standards. Application of these three criteria thus becomes necessary to determine the permissible scope of prison privatization.
A. The Danger of Financial Bias in Prison Management
Even if constitutional in the public sector, 81 judicial deference to everyday prison decisionmaking by private, for-profit firms is unwarranted and cannot be squared with the courts' longstanding presumption against the vesting of discretionary and coercive authority in financially interested parties. While state prison authorities may be inept or worse, they lack the incentives to raise prices and reduce quality which characterize a forprofit firm. 8 2 Because a nonprofit entity like the state cannot pocket its profits, 83 it is less likely than a for-profit delegate to seek to maximize private Board which ... is not subject to public accountability, at least where the exercise of such power is not accompanied by adequate legislative standards or safeguards whereby an application may be protected against arbitrary or self-motivated action on the part of such private body. 80. Of course, it might be argued that this tension is a straw man; it is possible that the courts would not apply the same deferential standard to private prisons as to public facilities. However, absent any indication to the contrary, there is no reason to be confident that judges will make a proper distinction and depart from the posture of extreme deference. This Note aims to demonstrate the nonviability of such a posture in light of the courts' own precedents.
81. But see Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 23, at 811-12 (delegation of "final word on reasonable prison practices" and "unreviewed administrative discretion" to "poorly trained personnel who deal directly with prisoners" violates Constitution); see also L. ORLAND, supra note 2, at 77 (citing "inherent conflict between prison and law"). 83. Professor Hansmann has labeled this limitation the "distribution constraint": The nonprofit producer, like its for-profit counterpart, has the capacity to raise prices and cut quality in such cases without much fear of customer reprisal; however, it lacks the incentive to do so because those in charge are barred from taking home any resulting profits. In other words, the advantage of a nonprofit producer is that the discipline of the market is supplemented by the additional protection given the consumer by another, broader "contract," the profits at the expense of duty. The identity and nature of the entity affording-indeed creating-or denying process rights partially determines what process is adequate or due; the judge with a pecuniary bias in a case, the licensing board member with a financial interest in excluding applicants, and the constable seeking clients for his private detective business bring to their tasks a bias which demands procedural checks. Process rights and service delivery are expensive, and a cost-conscious manager in the employ of a for-profit firm will have an interest in limiting both. The courts' unwillingness to impose procedural checks on prison officials' decisions regarding discipline, parole, good time, inmate transfer, and eligibility for rehabilitative programs may lead to abuses by private contractors seeking to increase profits and cut costs by lengthening sentences, lumping offenders in distant, multistate facilities,"' and limiting services provided to inmates. Reductions in the quality of health care, educational and vocational opportunities, and food services are more probable immediate responses, because they impinge less directly on liberty interests and thus are less likely to give rise to litigation. Both sorts of abuse can be expected, however, especially after the initial "honeymoon" period-in which a private contractor will seek to demonstrate its intention to meet, and perhaps even surpass, its contractual standards-has passed.
B. Fundamental Interests and Private Prisons
In prisons, the state exercises total control over human life. Inmates are at the mercy of the government, and must depend on prison personnel for their protection. The sensitivity of prisoners' rights, however diminished those rights may be by virtue of a criminal conviction, lies in the fact that, like children in an orphanage or nursing home patients, inmates are involuntary wards of the state, consumers without choice. 85 They are in no position to assess the services they receive or the rights they are accorded. In this setting, the liberty interests and fundamental rights that may invalidate private delegations thus take on special significance. 8 " One sentenced to prison by a judge should not have his liberty interest adjudicated anew for institutional purposes by a private corporation, but that is what allowing private contractors into a penal system largely devoid of due proorganization's legal commitment to devote its entire earnings to the production of services. As a result of this institutional constraint, it is less imperative for the consumer either to shop around first or to enforce rigorously the contract he makes.
Id.
84. See supra note 15 (Buckingham Security's plans to operate multistate facilities). 85. See Hansmann, supra note 82, at 844 (discussing situations in which consumers of services have no choice from whom they will procure services).
86. See Mashaw, supra note 46, at 93-94 (arguing that only delegations implicating these rights merit strict review).
Private Prisons cess guarantees would do. 1 7 Because prisons are beyond the ken of the everyday political and legal processes of society, and because inmates' due process rights are diminished in general, those vestiges of liberty that do persist-in particular the freedom from unjustified intrusions on personal integrity 8 " and the right to safe conditions of confinement and security from attack by other inmates 8 9 -merit jealous protection."
C. The Necessity-and Insufficiency-of Strict Contractual Standards
Strict standards are necessary to regulate prison privatization, but they are necessarily insufficient. Attempts to contract must reconcile the wide discretion inherent in routine prison operation 1 with the longstanding judicial hostility to private, self-serving power delegations. The constitutional concerns raised by the delegation of core prison disciplinary functions cannot be allayed by attempting to use contractual regulation to obviate judicial oversight of prison procedures; the courts' hostility to private delegations demands more. For three reasons, strict contractual provisions and enabling statutes will, at best, be only a buttress" 2 to the development of a new standard of judicial review. 91. In the closed world of the prison, see supra note 34, the absence of state regulation of any aspect of institutional discretion amounts to a de facto grant of self-regulation to the private contractor.
92. Strict contracts may complement heightened judicial scrutiny by guiding discretion. For example, contracts should expressly provide-as do most state codes-for the automatic accrual of good time conditioned only on good behavior, since the absence of such a provision might allow for punitive or vindictive behavior by private personnel or might, even more dangerously, permit contractors to maximize profits by increasing time served by inmates. Almost all the planned or existing private prisons operate on a per-diem, per capita basis. CCA, for instance, charges $21 per day for each prisoner it houses at its facility in Hamilton County, Tennessee. First, contracts stipulating that government personnel be placed in privatized facilities as monitors or even supervisors" might well reduce the possibility of serious managerial abuse, but to the extent that institutional discretion remains in private hands, either in the cellblock or in the boardroom, these safeguards will do little to alleviate the concerns surrounding private delegations." Of course, if supervision or monitoring expands to the point that public personnel are performing the core discretionary functions, 95 the private delegation problem may be solved, but the prison will no longer be a privatized one, or it will be one in which the original quest for profitability and operational flexibility behind the privatization has been entirely foregone.
Second, although the different attitude which the courts have taken toward public and private entities exercising delegated discretionary authority would seem to require that the standards enacted to guide that authority should be different as well, there is currently no principle mandating tough contracts since, unless the courts' adherence to a positivist entitle-(Cum. Supp. 1986).
Explicit authorization or deputization could greatly increase the legitimacy of prison employees, both in their own minds and in those of inmates, and would also ensure that the state has an interest in closely monitoring prison standards since its liability profile would be heightened; sworn oaths of office or formal deputization would eliminate any doubt about the presence of state action for purposes of prisoners' rights litigation under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1982 469-79 (1985) (surveying narrowing of "public function" analysis and criticizing legal distinction between independent contractor and public employee), the risk of government liability might prove less an incentive for strict public scrutiny than an encouragement to minimize state monitoring and deputization contacts or to seek such substantial indemnification from the contractor that the enterprise collapses.
95. The fact that no current or proposed statute even remotely approaches this alternative is proof enough of its impracticality. Pennsylvania's privatization bill, the strictest yet proposed, merely licenses inspectors and visitors. ment analysis is shaken, such safeguards are not constitutionally compelled." 8 In light of the expansion in prisoner rights litigation that more comprehensive regulation (and, hence, a more comprehensive set of due process entitlements) is likely to engender, 97 however, state officials will be less than anxious to promulgate strict standards to limit private adjudicative discretion. 98 Finally, the promulgation of strict contractual standards does not ensure their prompt and effective implementation; much less can it guarantee their continued force several years into the life of the contract, when legislative scrutiny may have weakened and when corporate control of the state's penal system may have reached the point that the government no longer has the expertise, personnel, facilities, or fiscal resources to run the prisons. In fact, the privatization standards enacted to date provide no more rigorous safeguards than those which already constrain public prison officials, Fenton Interview, supra note 15, namely an adherence to the vague guidelines provided by the American Correctional Association, see AMERICAN CORREC-
TIONAL ASS'N, PUBLIC CORRECTIONAL POLICY ON PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN CORREC-
TIONS (Ratified Jan. 20, 1985) (privatized services must "meet professional standards, provide necesssary public safety, provide services equal to or better than government, and be cost-effective compared to well-managed governmental operations"), and the minimal prescriptions laid down by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 36-37, 41, 42 and accompanying text (discussing current standards).
One grave concern not addressed by the American Correctional Association or by the Court's decisions that warrants attention in private prison contracts is guard training and quality; inadequate staff preparation may give rise to due process claims. Current training of public prison guards is, to be sure, hardly satisfactory, see J. JACoBs, supra note 9, at 134, but it is nonetheless disturbing that CCA, the largest and best capitalized of the private prison firms, provides its line personnel with a 40-hour training seminar only, Crane Interview, supra note 93, and that no state appears to have mandated specific training requirements for the private sector. This failure to mandate requirements is not surprising given that hiring guidelines are often minimal in the public sector, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-11 (1986) (requiring that correctional officers be citizens, of majority age, of good moral character, possess the equivalent of a high school education and pass physical fitness and aptitude examinations), and that training for the public prison guard is, as one leading commentator has put it, "the exception rather than the rule." J. JACoBS, supra note 9, at 134. 
POSITIVIST TRAP
The inability of contractual standards to safeguard inmates' rights adequately in privatized prisons, combined with the financial bias of prison firms and the sensitivity of the rights involved, places the courts in a crucial regulatory role. First and foremost, the Supreme Court should, in the private prison context, reconsider its positivist approach to due process rights. 99 Continued judicial reluctance to second-guess the judgments of prison staff would ignore the danger that private prison operators will act more abusively and arbitrarily than public officials. Leaving the creation and adjudication of entitlements to profit-seeking entities without close scrutiny cannot be equated with delegating these powers to public agencies. Privatization without retention of adequate control is inconsistent with the Court's own jurisprudence since an extension of positivism to private prisons would directly contradict the consistent suspicion of the Court toward for-profit delegations.
A reasoned application of nondelegation jurisprudence does not require a ban on prison privatization, since the Court's holdings do not derive from an Article I doctrine of per se invalidity. 1 00 It does, however, require heightened judicial scrutiny where matters of great concern to the state and interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are being handed over to private enterprise for the first time.
Such scrutiny must reflect a recognition that, regardless of the extent to which they are designated as public officials, private prison personnel will remain private employees. 101 Courts must therefore mandate not only considerably higher standards, but substantially less deferential review as well. 102 Measuring compliance with judicial decrees will be problem- 100. This is not to say that some state courts might not apply a rule of facial invalidity to private prisons, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, but merely to argue that, in this context, a dismantling of positivist prison jurisprudence would better accord with the due process/nondelegation principle as it has evolved in the modern administrative state. Moreover, even were a wholesale ban warranted by earlier decisions, the political difficulty of implementing such a ban, see supra note 13, combined with the Court's natural tendency to rule narrowly and on a case-by-case basis, would make a tough, non-deferential approach more practicable.
101. If prison personnel remain on the government payroll though under private corporate management, as they do at the Butler County Jail, Fenton Interview, supra note 15, they nonetheless operate under the supervision of a for-profit, rather than a nonprofit, entity. At the least, the stricter standard of review proposed herein should apply in such instances to the discretionary activities of the facility's management, few of which would be separable from the activities of line personnel.
102. It might be objected that a more intense standard of review for private prisons would violate the equal protection rights of inmates in state-run facilities; prisoners might be treated better by jailers Vol. 96: 815, 1987 atic. 10 5 Nonetheless, an explicit merger of due process and nondelegation doctrines, long practiced by the courts in regard to other private delegations, combined with judicial willingness to intervene in prisons, could prevent privatization from worsening an already calamitous correctional system.1 0 4
Abusive and arbitrary treatment, of course, is not limited to the extreme and highly unlikely depredations of enslavement and corporal punishment. Courts should be especially alert for more subtle deprivations, such as improper revocation of good time, unwarranted tightening of internal disciplinary and parole hearing procedures, arbitrary imposition of administrative segregation and transfer, and increases in searches and seizures, all of which might seem rational and efficient to private contractors.
Rigorous judicial scrutiny may either undermine the truly private nature of these facilities or undercut the economic advantages of privatization by imposing prohibitively expensive constitutional requirements on contractors. However, efficiency gains must not come at the expense of process rights. If they do, then legislators and corrections officials will have strong evidence that prison privatization was not the panacea it was initially advertised to be.
Second, even if the Court refuses to qualify its approach in this new area, it should be especially ready to invoke the "last resort" safeguards of the First and Eighth Amendments. The recent trend away from "handswho know that their facility is being closely scrutinized. However, such an objection mistakes an instrumental difference for a substantive one; as Hansmann's "distribution constraint" (see supra notes 82-83) illustrates, heightened vigilance is required just to ensure that private, for-profit prisons are as scrupulous as (not necessarily more scrupulous than) public ones. A harder judicial look at private facilities would, therefore, constitute not special, but merely ameliorative, treatment.
It may be that the fall of positivism in this context would lead inexorably to the conclusion that positivism in the public prison context must be discarded as well. Such a conclusion, however, is not necessary to prove the point that positivism should be abandoned in the more limited area of private, for-profit delegations. A rejection of deference in prison law as a whole would derive not from due process-driven principles affecting private delegations but from objections to the wide discretion exercised by public prison staff. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
103. See J. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 49, 53 (citing "ambiguity" of declaratory judgments, consent decrees, and injunctions in prison cases and noting that courts may retain jurisdiction for several years); AFTER DECISION, supra note 5, at 113-14 (noting that, although Holt litigation wrought "broad and profound" changes in Arkansas prison system, conditions still remained "less than ideal"). on" adjudication in conditions of confinement cases, 10 5 unfortunate enough in the public sector, should certainly not extend to cases arising in the private sector. An unwillingness to afford stricter process scrutiny need not preclude heightened vigilance with regard to these other, and even more fundamental, rights.
Third, the Court should insist that the state maintain control over adjudicative discretion-that any de facto adjudications performed by private, for-profit entities be carefully limited and constantly reviewed. This might involve the creation of an ombudsman with sufficient staff and resources to implement guidelines that the courts and the legislature devise for key discretionary functions, such as administrative segregation, disciplinary hearings, good time and parole revocation, search and seizure, transfer, and security classification. 10 6 Moreover, prisoners' rights advocacy organizations and other public interest groups should participate in review and oversight. Their watchdog role will be more important in private prisons since any relaxation in the vigilance of the courts or the political branches could have grave consequences for private prison inmates and since the state has clear disincentives for bringing cases which, under the state action doctrine, 10 7 are really against itself. Fourth, to ensure that private regulation will be interstitial only, the courts should insist that basic rulemaking be done only by appropriate governmental entities. Fifth, as an added incentive for contractors to maintain adequate standards and safeguard prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court should refrain from extending to private prisons its recent holdings that preclude government liability for inmate harms caused by mere negligence. 0 8 As Justice Blackmun noted in dissenting from this new doctrine, in some endeavors, and especially in prison management, governmental negligence can be an abuse of power implicating due process rights. 10 9 This is especially true in privatized prisons, where profit-seeking creates still greater potential for abuse. Absent such a reversal, however, state law should expressly provide for liability of private guards in cases of mere negligence. Finally, whatever doctrinal course the Supreme Court steers in the area of prison law, the state courts should not abandon the more Private Prisons rigorous nondelegation standards they have long held, 110 and should find prison privatization the ripest ground yet for invoking their traditional concern over delegations to private, for-profit entities.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note does not dispute the poor state of American prisons today; nor does it deny the potential utility of privatizing secondary services within those prisons. At a minimum, however, if government abandons direct day-to-day control of core discretionary functions, strict contractual guidelines must be established and the deferential standard of judicial review must be altered to provide for more intense scrutiny. These reforms may eliminate the economic advantages that have impelled the privatization campaign. Cost concerns, however, cannot be allowed to transcend the state's duty to provide for those whom it has felt necessary to remove from society. "The Constitution," as the Court noted in Stanley v. Illinois, "recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." 
